Connections: The Quarterly Journal

ISSN 1812-1098, e-ISSN 1812-2973

Irina Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.3.05

Research Article

Britain and the Common Security and Defense

Policy of the European Union

Irina Tsertsvadze

Ministry of Defense, Georgia, https://mod.gov.ge/en

Abstract: This article analyzes Britain’s position towards the Common Se-

curity and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union from 1998 to 2016.

It considers the reasoning for Britain’s position toward CSDP through pos-

ing the research question: Why did Britain backed the launch of the CSDP

and then not consistently support all its developments? Using a case study

approach, it concentrates on the main developments of the CSDP, which

are: launch of the CSDP (1998–1999); development of the operational

headquarters (2010–2011); role of Britain in the Libyan crisis, which is not

related to the institutional developments, but still is very important as the

first real chance for the CSDP to be tested after its launch.

Through Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory, the article seeks to support

the twin hypotheses that domestic affairs influence Britain’s decisions to-

wards CSDP, and that developments within the European Union impact on

Britain’s position towards CSDP through the interplay with domestic fac-

tors.

Keywords: Security and defense policy, EU, Britain, game theory, national

interest, CSDP.

Introduction

Every international negotiation can be considered as a ‘game’ on two levels and

the struggle to achieve consensus – first between the domestic constituents and

then to bargain the achieved consensus on the international level. This is the

Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense

Creative Commons

Academies and Security Studies Institutes

BY-NC-SA 4.0

Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

essence of Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory.1 At the domestic level, policy mak-

ers are trying to lobby their policies through the different political groups and, in

seeking for power, they are looking to create different coalitions in order to

pursue their policies. At the international level, negotiators are trying to

minimize the risk of sacrificing domestic pressure and minimizing negative con-

sequences of foreign developments. “Any [national] leader who fails to satisfy

his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat,” says

Putnam.2

This article analyses the reasoning behind Britain’s position toward the Eu-

ropean Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) prior to the Brexit

decision by asking the question: “Why did Britain back the launch of the CSDP

and then fail to consistently support all of its developments?” The answers will

be found in the way that British domestic affairs influenced Britain’s decisions

towards CSDP, just as developments within the European Union impacted on

Britain’s position towards CSDP.

It appears that the decisions made by the British Government from 1998 to

2016 towards the CSDP were indeed influenced both by domestic politics and by

the developments in the EU, as indicated by Putnam. Three concrete case studies

give the examination structure and chronology. These are:

• Launching CSDP: Constructive role of UK (1998-1999)

• Operationalizing CSDP: UK blocking the Operational HQ (2010-2011)

• The role of Britain in the Libyan crisis (2011)

Depending on one’s point of view, taken together, these studies show either

different facets of British policy-making in the security and defense field, or a

singular kind of inconsistency that led, eventually, to the Brexit decision and its

aftermath.

The Setting and Context

CSDP is an unusual political phenomenon that does not fit easily into traditional

international relations theories because of the grouping of sovereign states in an

international subsystem. The main confusion comes with the collective decision-

making over security and defense issues, which are commonly supposed to be

the last thing that EU member states would give up within collective decision

making. Jolyon Howorth, a leading scholar in the area of European security,

describes the situation as follows: “The moves towards pooling that last bastion

of ‘sovereignty’—Security and Defence Policy—with all their limitations and

1 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games,”

International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-460.

2 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 437.

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Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU

caveats, constitute a sea-change in the way the EU and its member states will

henceforth relate to the outside world.”3

That may have been part of the UK’s problems with CSDP but the beginning

of the 21st century has also been marked by an increase in geopolitical volatility.

The Arab Spring, the unraveling of Libya and Syria, the rise of ISIS in Syria and

Iraq, Russia’s invasion in Georgia and Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the

refugee crisis – all these suggested that new ways were necessary to ensure the

security of members of the Europe Union. Currently, the EU needs to rethink the

way it acts, its principles, interests and priorities. As EU’s High Representative of

the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini pointed out, “In challenging

times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts

together. This is even more true after the British referendum.”4 It is clear that

the crises beyond the borders are challenging the EU and its CSDP. The policy is

a post-Cold War phenomenon stemming from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.5 The

appearance of it has corresponded to a precise historical context: the integration

of Western Europe.

In that context, British leaders have been in a dilemma, trying to adjust the

balance between American and European interests, rather than giving the EU

priority. As one commentator put it, “In the 1970s, they leaned too far the other

way, entering the European Communities on disadvantageous terms. Since the

1980s they have increasingly leaned away from Europe again, renegotiating their

financial contributions in 1984-85, opting out of the euro in 1992, joining the

American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and now divorcing the EU altogether.”6 From

this political discourse, one may assume that being pro-European has been

mostly unpopular in Britain: if politicians wanted to survive domestic debate,

they would criticize Brussels. “British ministers often oppose measures coming

3 David R. Smith, The EU Divided: Effects of Dissimilar National Foreign Policies on CSDP

(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, Yale College, December 2, 2011),

https://politicalscience.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Smith_Devin.pdf.

Jolyon

Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP,” in The International

Relations of the European Union, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2005), 182.

4 “High Representative Mogherini presents EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security

Policy,”

EU

Summit,

Brussels,

2016,

accessed

November

20,

2016,

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/7337/high-

representative-mogherini-presents-eu-global-strategy-foreign-and-security-

policy_en.

5 “Maastricht Treaty,” February 7, 1992, accessed December 15, 2016, http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Axy0026.

6 Ian Morris, “A Brief History of Britain’s Relationship, Starting in 6000 BCE,” Harvard

Business Review, Digital Article, June 24, 2016, accessed February 20, 2017,

https://hbr.org/2016/06/a-brief-history-of-britains-relationship-with-europe-

starting-in-6000-bce.

75

Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

out of Brussels or other capitals because they fear the reaction of the British

media or public.”7

The interaction is clear between the domestic and international politics as it

applies to British policy towards the European Union’s CSDP. This is the reason

behind choosing the three case studies as illustrations: they best explain the

positive, negative and in-between roles of Britain within the CSDP. All three of

them underline different positions of Britain towards the institutional devel-

opments of the CSDP and thus give us ground to analyze the reasoning behind

them. The launch of CSDP is historically the most important development of the

concept; without Britain, it is hardly imaginable that it could happen. Developing

a military-operational Headquarters for the EU could have been the second

major event in the history of the CSDP, but it did not happen because Britain

rejected the idea. Intervening in Libya in the 2011 crisis with an EU military force

could have been the first ever real test for the policy, but EU opinions were

divided. For Britain, the principal issue was a technical one – to be involved indi-

vidually, bilaterally with France, or collectively through either the EU or NATO.

Ideologically, France, the other big military power within the EU, was for a united

and strong Europe relying on its own military capabilities. With the Libyan

decision, domestic politics operated differently on security policy-making in

London and Paris. In both cases, the Two-Level Game theory by Robert D.

Putnam is a useful tool for analysis.

The heart of the theory is that international negotiations are characterized

by simultaneous activities at the domestic and international levels. A national

negotiating team seeks to maximize its state’s international ‘win-set,’ in Put-

nam’s phrase, and does so by constantly being aware of its own domestic inhi-

bitions and constraints. Agreements internationally are therefore the outcome

of overlaps between the win-sets of the states involved in the negotiations. For

the three case studies here, this can be articulated in our case studies as fol-

lowing: for Tony Blair in 1998, without domestic support on his decision to help

launch CSDP, it would be difficult to have achieved the win-set. For David Cam-

eron ten years later, because he did not have support from the major political

parties on establishing the Operational Headquarter of the EU, the win-set of the

EU in this case could not be achieved.

Application of the Two Level Game Theory to the Case Studies

According to Robert D. Putnam, domestic politics is crucial in any kind of inter-

national negotiation theory. Power and preferences of the major political actors

on the domestic level should be taken into account. If the big win-set is to be

achieved on the international level, the chief negotiator needs to keep in mind

that all the constituents at the internal level will take part in the ratification

7 Charles Grant, “Why Is Britain Eurosceptic,” Essay, Center for European Reform, De-

cember 19, 2008, accessed February 28, 2017, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/

archive/essay/2008/why-britain-eurosceptic.

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Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU

process on the domestic level.8 On the EU’s level, this theoretical approach

demonstrates that when the time of the decision-making comes, each member

of the EU is thinking of the potential domestic consequences and less about the

common good of the EU in general.

Launching CSDP / Constructive Role of Britain (1998–99)

After the end of the Cold War, the United States had other foreign policy priori-

ties than guaranteeing the security of Western Europe. New security paradigms

started to emerge. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, policy makers in Washington

switched their attention to Asia, the Gulf and the Middle East, underlining the

feeling that Europe was no longer a problem. The United States’ approach was

simple: European security had to be delivered by the Europeans themselves.

Wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s soon demonstrated the inability of the European

Union to guarantee security on the continental Europe. This development made

it obvious that the EU was in need of a permanent security and defense system

on which it could rely.

Following the end of the Cold War, the idea of a Common Security and De-

fense Policy was announced after the introduction of the Common Foreign and

Security Policy as the second pillar of the EU under the Maastricht Treaty.

However, it was not implemented straight away. In fact, it was not until the

Saint-Malo Summit in 1998 that it became a possibility.

It is well known that the Labour government that came to power in 1997 was

distinctly more pro-European than any of its predecessors. “Tony Blair arrived strong and with a modernizing agenda that seemed to put Europe at the heart

of Britain as much as the other way round.”9 The most important aspect of Blair’s

European legacy is widely considered to be the Saint-Malo Summit where,

together with the French President, Jacques Chirac, he tried to launch a real

foreign and security policy for Europe. The Saint-Malo Summit in September

1998 ended with a declaration stressing the importance of the security dimen-

sion and that implementation machinery and the ability to deploy forces were

essential for the EU’s external policy.

This part of the case study very much strengthens the Putnam-related notion

that domestic affairs influence Britain’s decisions towards the Common Security

and Defense Policy. However, the international level should not be ignored.

Three issues were important at the time. The first was the dominant role of the

USA in European defense; secondly, the aftermath of the wars in Yugoslavia; and,

thirdly, the readiness within the EU itself to strengthen security and defense

capabilities. Together they created an interplay between the domestic and inter-

national factors and pushed for a positive decision: in effect, a win-set both for

8 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics.”

9 Simon Berlaymont, “Tony Blair and Europe,” Open Democracy, free thinking for the

world, May 30, 2007, accessed January 31, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/

tony_blair_and_europe.jsp.

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Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

Britain and EU. With the Saint-Malo declaration Britain, together with France,

was aiming to transform the EU into a positive actor in the security field in

Europe and for Europe by equipping itself with the kind of military capabilities

so obviously absent during the recent Yugoslav conflicts.

The wording of the declaration, which Britain and France signed, was clear

and demanding, saying: “…. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous

action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them,

and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”10 For a

number of scholars, this declaration did not outline the real intentions: “Even if

Britain was so supportive of the European defense project after the Saint-Malo

initiative with France in 1998, the British idea was more to lead than to partici-

pate. If various continentals got together and compensated for individual weak-

ness by working together, then that was fine, but the UK itself would of course

have no need to resort to such shifts.”11 This is not surprising, having in mind the

historical heritage of Britain as an empire, which did not believe in credible mili-

tary partnerships with European countries. In addition, British Atlanticism and

the ‘special’ relationship with the US gives the ground to some scholars to say

that: “The US has consistently pressured the UK to become a full and active par-

ticipant in all EU policy areas, including defense and security. That was one fun-

damental reason why Tony Blair went to Saint-Malo. If the UK found itself out-

side the EU, what could it offer the US in terms of security and defense.”12 Thus,

it can be said that the position of the British decision makers—and of Tony Blair

in particular—were very much influenced by the developments within the EU,

especially the EU’s desire itself to strengthen security and defense and on the

broader international level when the US had become very much more interested

in a strong EU responsible for the security of its borders.

To sum up the first case, it should be mentioned that the launch of the CSDP

was not purely the result of developments within Britain or the EU. One can go

even further and say that the major factor was the limited role of the United

States in European security. Despite the fact that Tony Blair was the leader of

the Labour Party, he was more enthusiastic towards the EU than anyone else

was in the British Labour Party. Because of the changed political environment

and the interplay of domestic and international factors, his policies in the office

of the Prime Minister of Britain were different from previous governments. Blair

10 Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, Foreign and Com-

monwealth Office of the United Kingdom, August 12, 2008, http://www.fco.gov.uk/

en/newsroom/latest-news/?view=News&id=2244063.

11 Clara Marina O’Donnell, “Britain and France should not give up on EU defence co-

operation,” Policy Brief, Center for European Reform, October, 2011, accessed March

15, 2017, https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/

2011/pb_csdp_24oct11-3907.pdf.

12 Jolyon Howorth, “The CSDP without the UK: bad for Europe but even worse for Brit-

ain,” in The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives, ed. Daniel

Fiott (Brussels: The Royal Institute for International Relations, May 2015), 19, accessed

March 15, 2017, http://aei.pitt.edu/64766/1/ep79.pdf.

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Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU

had no opposition to his taking the leading role in the CSDP. He very well

understood what the US expected from Britain – to take the initiative within Eu-

rope in order to guarantee a strong partnership. Having concluded that it would

be unacceptable for Britain to join the Euro Zone and the Schengen Agreement,

he concentrated on the areas of security and defense. This was also in alignment

with the historical British tradition of having a strong military force. However,

looking at the Britain’s role within CSDP almost 20 years afterwards, one can

assume that the decision was more tactical than strategic, because very soon

after that historical decision Britain isolated itself from the major institutional

developments of the CSDP. The following case studies will consider further de-

velopments in the CSDP and Britain’s role within it.

Initial Development of the CSDP: UK Blocking the Operational HQ (2010–

11)

The Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in 2007 and implemented in 2009, is about

the establishment of a stronger and more focused central foreign policy with

significantly upgraded tools at its disposal. The treaty moved away from the Eu-

ropean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to CSDP. “According to the Lisbon

Treaty, the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy has been bolstered in order to strengthen the EU’s voice on the

world stage. He will preside over the Foreign Affairs Council and will also be Vice-

President of the Commission. A new European External Action Service will sup-

port the High Representative.”13

The Lisbon Treaty introduced important provisions connected to the CSDP,

including a mutual assistance and solidarity clause and the expansion of the Pe-

tersberg tasks.14 The creation of an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) became

one of the major issues in the relationship between the EU and Britain after

David Cameron’s Conservative Party took office. For Catherine Ashton, the EU’s

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the creation of the

OHQ was closely connected to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. But the

interplay of domestic and international factors during the ongoing discourse on

the establishment of the HQ very much defined its future.

13 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, “The Lisbon Treaty – brief overview of the key changes,”

European Union, November 4, 2009, accessed May 13, 2017, www.lexology.com/

library/detail.aspx?g=48a4327a-c5e8-41a7-8000-c93e90abe763.

14 Petersberg tasks were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial

Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992. On that occasion, the

WEU member countries declared their readiness to make available to the WEU, but

also to NATO and the EU, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional

armed forces. By now, the list of Petersberg tasks includes: humanitarian and rescue

tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping task; tasks of combat forces in crisis man-

agement, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and

assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilization tasks. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/

glossary/petersberg_tasks.html.

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Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

As Alistair Jones puts it, despite the fact that it was the Conservative gov-

ernment which brought Britain into the EEC in 1973, the Conservative Party has

traditionally been Eurosceptic.15 Margaret Thatcher saw Britain’s role as crucial

within the Union and, for her, being ‘inside’ meant protecting British interests

far more effectively.16 But, the leaders after Thatcher did not always see it that

way. David Cameron, for example, is sometimes considered to be the most Eu-

rosceptic leader of his party. This can easily be understood by the careful policies

he developed towards CSDP.

David Cameron was very cautious about policy towards the EU from the very

first day of taking the office. On the domestic level, he knew that majority of his

party members were Eurosceptic and took care in avoiding the risk of losing

domestic support. Indeed, the first factor of Putnam’s theory that the size of the

win-set depends on the domestic political institutions is demonstrated by Cam-

eron’s actions in avoiding being active on the EU level. He, therefore, avoided

losing the support of the domestic institutions. Nevertheless, he still had to take

into account the views of his pro-EU coalition partners and the active media dis-

cussion over Britain leaving the EU as major factors in any CSDP-related deci-

sions.

Catherine Ashton, a British Labour politician, was the first High Representa-

tive of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy after the creation of the post

according the Lisbon Treaty. She considered the creation of the HQ as being part

of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. She was strongly supported by Ger-

many and France in this view. But, she was just as strongly opposed by the British

government. Consequently, the headquarters arrangements were not made. As

Ashton commented, “This was to fulfill what the Lisbon Treaty was all about,”

she said. “The position of the British government is the same as the last govern-

ment. It is not a blow, it was no surprise. It is important to put ideas on the table

even if member states decide to reject them.”17

The Conservative Foreign Minister, William Hague, was concerned that Lady

Ashton’s initiative could give EU new security power, which would require addi-

tional finances in an era of big financial cuts and could also undermine NATO’s

role. After a row marking Britain’s most serious rift with Lady Ashton, he warned

that any mention of an EU military headquarters would trigger a British veto.18

So, although many EU member countries, including France, were very supportive

of the initiative of creating an EU military HQ, because of the British veto, it was

never implemented.

15 Alistair Jones, Britain and the European Union (Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

16 Jones, Britain and the European Union, 27.

17 Bruno Waterfield, “Britain blocks EU plans for ‘operational military headquarters’,”

The Telegraph, July 18, 2011, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-

military-headquarters.html.

18 Waterfield, “Britain,” 28.

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Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU

Analysis of this case study shows the constant interplay between the do-

mestic and international pressures which, in this case, did not bring to fruition

the desired win-set for the EU. As in the first case study, we can argue that, while

Britain was taking decisions over the creation of the EU operational headquar-

ters, many factors, including developments within the EU, influenced Cameron.

The EU was in the process of recovering from the post-2008 financial and eco-

nomic crises and countries were hesitant to spend money on multilateral com-

mitments; member states were resisting moves towards spending more on de-

fense and security.

As with Saint-Malo, there was an ideological divide: the UK did not see the

conceptual requirement for an EU military HQ. Instead, Britain was suggesting a

cooperative approach, rather than creating this new institution. Hague’s idea

was to improve the links between existing national HQs. Simon Smith argues,

“The UK’s answer is always: we do not need one and there are plenty of military

OHQs already in place in Europe. They will also say what type of military mission

is so big that a national HQ cannot manage it? Or if it were, then NATO would

most likely be involved anyway. Yet, this misses the need for CSDP to be able to

do proper operational planning before a large crisis, especially combined civ-mil

planning.”19

From a British perspective, the reasons for opposing the OHQ were financial

and the need not to duplicate NATO’s role in Europe. Preventing the decision

against the operational headquarters can therefore be seen, for Britain, as a

significant win-set achieved on the international level. Nor was this just a benefit

to the UK. As Daniel Fiott points out,

Of course, why UK officials were really skeptical was finding the necessary political

will and capacity in Europe to fund, man and use such a sizable OHQ. It was very

hard to get member states to invest in capabilities at all, never mind for CSDP. The

nations all ask, how much will it cost us if they get used?20

By that time, back in 2011, the EU was already running a series of overseas

military missions and operations, such as a naval anti-piracy mission off the coast

of Somalia and the Balkans peacekeeping mission, none of which seemed

compromised by the lack of multinational HQ. The British argument about the

effectiveness of existing military operations being managed from a national HQ

was based on the EUNAVFOR Atalanta, with the HQ in Northwood, UK.

19 Simon J. Smith, “European Defence, CSDP and the UK: two cases of catch-22,” in The

Common Security and Defense Policy: National Perspectives, ed. Daniel Fiott (Brussles:

The Royal Institute for the International Relations, 2015), accessed February 17, 2017,

http://aei.pitt.edu/64766/1/ep79.pdf.

20 Daniel Fiott, ed., The Common Security and Defense Policy: National Perspectives, EG-

MONT Paper 79 (Brussels: The Royal Institute for the International Relations, 2015),

accessed March 15, 2017, http://aei.pitt.edu/64766/1/ep79.pdf.

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Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

Role of the United Kingdom in the Libyan Crisis (2011)

In spring 2011, the president of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, used force to suppress

a popular revolt against his regime. The Libyan crisis was “one of the pieces of

the broader puzzle of the Arab Spring,” that spread with spillover effects through

the Middle East and North Africa.21 In contrast to the previous two case studies,

Britain’s role in the Libyan crisis cannot be defined as a decision to support or

block institutional developments of the CSDP. The crises over Libya in 2011 test-

ed the CSDP and Britain, among other military powers of the EU, definitely had

a role in this context.

France, in particular, found itself struggling to convince European partners to

embark on military action. Because of the inaction and reluctance of the United

States, Britain and France first focused efforts on getting the UN Security Council

Resolution 1973 adopted. London and Paris seem to have considered that secur-

ing the UN mandate took priority over developing EU control of the Libyan op-

erations. This might also be explained by the fact that they were both reluctant

to surrender operational control to an EU body, preferring instead to rely on

their respective air force chains of command.

For Britain, the win-set in the Libyan crisis was effective military involvement.

The issue was a technical one: whether the operation would be under EU or

NATO auspices. Cameron had domestic support: the Labour leader, Ed Miliband,

gave full backing to military action and the House of Commons approved the

military action by 557 votes to 13. Anti-Gaddafi public opinion in Britain was

already strong. Before the actual operation in Libya started, British oil workers

in Libya had to be evacuated from an unfriendly situation. In addition, Gaddafi’s

security forces captured and beat up members of a BBC team and six members

of one of the UK’s elite special forces squadrons were allegedly captured and

detained.22

Cameron was mostly influenced by international factors because UK domes-

tic opinion on intervening in Libya by the CSDP was not as problematic as it could

have been. The positions of the EU member states were fragmented. Indeed,

having specific relations with the Libyan Government over the oil deals made

some member states reluctant to act. There was no united position on dealing

with the crisis using EU’s military capabilities. This controversy between the do-

mestic and international levels very much influenced Cameron not to push for

the CSDP to be involved. If, on the EU level, the member countries had had a

consensus, meaning the big win-set, it could have positively affected the final

decision and the outcome for the CSDP. But, on Libya that consensus was missing

across the EU for various domestic reasons. Frustratingly, for CSDP purists, 20

years after the Balkan crises when CSDP was initiated, it must have seemed that

21 Maxime H.A. Larivé, Debating European Security and Defense Policy: Understanding

the Complexity (Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014), 209.

22 “Timeline: UK’s road to action in Libya,” BBC News, April 15, 2011, accessed April 2,

2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12821505.

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Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU

the Libya crisis was the scenario for which CSDP had been created. As a result,

the absence of a centralized command and control center of the EU itself became

a reason for the limited possibility of acting rapidly. CSDP could not be the

leading instrument; it was not institutionally in permanent readiness.

The Libyan intervention started on March 19, 2011, after the UN Security

Council approved a “no fly zone” on March 17. The operation was conducted

under the umbrella of NATO support, with Britain and France having the joint

lead. This demonstrated that, even 20 years after the Balkan wars, Western Eu-

rope was incapable, on its own, of policing a no fly zone without NATO.23 As to

the actual operation, together with the US, UK launched 12 Tomahawk missiles

from one submarine off the Libya coast and contributed as well one Royal Air

Force base.24 After this attack, articles appeared in the British press saying, for

example: “Up to 20 per cent of the UKs Tomahawks has been used in the past

four days in Libya, causing fears that it is burning through its armory.”25 In sum,

a very small engagement on the borders of Europe had exposed the fragility of

Britain’s defense capabilities, a point that reinforced its skepticism about multi-

national command and control of operations. Nor was Britain alone in this. The

response that the EU gave to the Libya crisis was a demonstration of the fact that

EU could not process its military and defense capabilities within a multinational

framework without an EU consensus. This was summed up by the International

Institute for Security Studies thus: “They have shown the emptiness of claims

that the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 could make the EU better fitted to take action

than it was during the crises of the Balkans.”26

Addressing the UK elements of the win-set, from Putnam’s Two-Level Game

Theory, it can be said that the win-set in the Libya crises depended on both

domestic and international factors. Cameron did not have to struggle much on a

domestic level. But still, domestic factors were involved in the interplay with the

EU – which itself did not have a united position on the intervention via CSDP. If

the EU had had a strong position, the outcome of CSDP involvement would prob-

ably have been different. We can conclude that during the negotiations the

outcome depended on the size of the win-set, the bigger win-set being success-

ful. So, if EU could have had the bigger win-set, meaning having consensus

between the members states on intervention in Libya, the last win-set, the inter-

23 It is useful to recall that Germany abstained in the UN security Council on the matter

of Libyan no fly zones.

24 Thomas Harding, “Libya: Navy running short of Tomahawk missiles,” The Telegraph,

March 23, 2011, accessed April 5, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/

worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8400079/Libya-Navy-running-short-of-

Tomahawk-missiles.html.

25 Harding, “Libya,” 32.

26 “War in Libya: Europe’s confused response,” The International Institute for Security

Studies, Volume 17, Comment 18, April 2011, accessed February 28, 2017.

http://deps.panteion.gr/images/Libya-Europe-confused-response.pdf.

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Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

vention itself could be different, because EU’s common decision could have influ-

enced Britain’s position as well.

It is reasonable to conclude that, even in the cases when Britain does not

have radically positive or radically negative positions towards CSDP, the interplay

between the domestic and international factors still applies. In the Libyan case,

intervening via CSDP was not the win-set for Britain—the win-set was the

intervention itself—but it was not the same win-set for the CSDP/EU, which had

its problems of policy incoherence in this instance.

Conclusion

The three case studies help to answer the research question, “Why did Britain

back the launch of the CSDP but did not then consistently support all its devel-

opments?” The interplay between domestic and international levels is evident in

the all three case studies, but the level of controversy between them is different.

We can say that Britain has never had a strong political pro-European movement

unlike the other EU member countries. The membership of the EU was important

to Britain without having to play a full part in it. In the UK’s Strategic Defense and

Security Review 2015, there is not a single reference to Britain’s role in the

CSDP.27 Some scholars interpreted this as Britain ignoring the Common Security

and Defense Policy, thinking separately of its challenges and opportunities

through the timeline of being part of it. Certainly, in Britain’s positions towards

CSDP there has always been an interplay between domestic and international

factors. It is safe to assume that the Putnam concept of the win-set, in general,

helps to explain Britain’s domestic and foreign policy approaches to CSDP.

The first case study, launching the CSDP, is an example how Britain was

pushing towards CSDP. Britain’s role in the CSDP has been abundantly discussed

after the Europe’s attempt to develop autonomy in the security and defense

spheres. The Saint-Malo Declaration was signed in December 1998 by British

Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, who met to advance the creation of a European Security and Defense Policy, including a European military force capable of autonomous action. The Saint-Malo declaration was a response to the armed conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s, in which the international community, and especially the European Union and its member states, were perceived to have failed to intervene to stop the conflict. The fact

that British Government was pushing for the EU’s Security and Defense policy

was taken by a wide range of scholars as Britain’s initiative to lead CSDP. This

first case study is the demonstration of the first factor of the win-set, Britain was

very much for strengthening EU’s defense capabilities and it had consensus at

the domestic level as well. The decision made in Saint-Malo was influenced for

27 “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015,” Policy

Paper (UK Government, November 23, 2015), accessed April 10, 2017,

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-

strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015.

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Britain and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU

Britain by both domestic and EU developments, reflecting Putnam’s parallel

levels game theory.

The second case study, between 2010–11, showed Britain blocking opera-

tional development and the establishment of an HQ, has a different outcome but

the theory remains applicable from the UK side. The creation of the Operational

Headquarters had become one of the major issues of the EU-British relationships

after the David Cameron’s Conservative party took office. Catherine Ashton con-

sidered the creation of the HQ “was to fulfill what the Lisbon Treaty was all

about.”28 This case study is analyzed by the second factor of the win-set, where

success of win-set depends on the strategies of the negotiator on the interna-

tional level; the win-set for the David Cameron’s traditionally Eurosceptic gov-

ernment was to block the creation of the operational Headquarters for the EU –

again, this decision was influenced both by domestic politics in Britain and devel-

opments within the EU.

The third case study, which concentrated on Britain’s role in the Libyan crisis,

is not traditionally about the role of the CSDP in institutional development, but

it is more about the chance of the CSDP to be tested in a real-life scenario and

about Britain and others indirectly undermining it. On the domestic level, Cam-

eron did not meet opposition to military involvement in the crisis, but on the EU

and wider international level, there were contrary factors that defined Britain’s

position. First, the EU members were not of one mind on Libya; CSDP was always

going to be a difficult instrument to use. Secondly, the UK preferred a bilateral

involvement with France. Thirdly, there was the natural bias towards NATO

which, with France, is also why the operation was carried out under the NATO

umbrella. One can argue, for France, it was generally an ideological matter to

prefer the idea of the strong and united Europe but for the Libyan crisis the nec-

essary agreement was not in place across the EU. For Britain, the issue of leader-

ship in the Libyan operation was purely technical. There was a decision to be

involved, but it was not one to be involved via CSDP. Britain never believed in

the military capabilities of the EU. Previous case studies show that even when

supporting the idea of CSDP, it was very much the result of developments within

the EU and the USA and fell well short of a wholehearted commitment by Britain.

This article and applied theoretical framework gives food for thought about

the future of both Britain and the CSDP. In general, we could see CSDP as the

future of the EU’s global security. It is clear that Britain cannot avoid military

cooperation with EU member states. Perhaps post-Brexit, conditions will make

cooperation even closer. Our research shows that Britain never felt comfortable

sharing military independence on the multilateral level other than within NATO.

But NATO is a different case, everyone agrees that USA has the leadership of the

organization and, having historically varied but usually close ties with the US,

Britain is considered to be the European ally of Washington within NATO.

28 Waterfield, “Britain,” 28.

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Tsertsvadze, Connections QJ 16, no. 3 (2017): 73-86

After the Brexit decision, Britain was accused of ‘paralyzing’ CSDP by the Ger-

man Minister of the Defense.29 However, this may be a superficial judgement.

Things have traditionally worked better on a bilateral level. Therefore, in the next

five years, we may see different forms of cooperation based on the concept of

‘plus’ – it can be Britain plus US; Britain plus EU; Britain plus member countries;

and Britain plus extra-European countries as well. As for the CSDP, many scholars

argue that Brexit gives a momentum to the EU to breathe new life into its secu-

rity and defense policy. An additional factor is the United States and President

Donald Trump, who, by his statements, appears to be reluctant to assist in Euro-

pean Security. Perhaps this, more than any other single factor, will be the cata-

lyst for the CSDP to blossom – at last.

About the Author

Irina Tsertsvadze is Head of EU Integration and Relations with the International

Organizations Division, Ministry of Defense of Georgia since May 20015. Prior to

this, she worked at the Parliament of Georgia, Committee on European Integra-

tion, where she was leading the cooperation with the International Organiza-

tions, local NGOs and Media Outlets. Her background includes five years working

as an international journalist in Moscow, Russia, as a Georgian Public Broadcast-

ers correspondent (2007-2008) and International Broadcaster at VOA Georgian

Service, Washington DC, USA (2009-2010). She holds a BA in International Jour-

nalism from Tbilisi State University, Specialist Diploma in TV Journalism from

Moscow State University and MAS in International and European Security from

the University of Geneva. Irina is alumni of George C. Marshall European Center

for Security Studies and was GCMC Fellow of 2014. She is also a fellow of CBGL

program at Georgian Foundation of Strategic and International Studies of 2012.

Currently Irina is PhD student at Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. Irina is flu-

ent in Georgia, English and Russian.

29 Daniel Keohane, “Can France and Germany lead European Defence?” Europe’s World,

accessed April 12, 2017, http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/can-france-

and-germany-lead-european-defence.

86

Document Outline

- Introduction

- The Setting and Context

- Application of the Two Level Game Theory to the Case Studies

- Launching CSDP / Constructive Role of Britain (1998–99)

- Initial Development of the CSDP: UK Blocking the Operational HQ (2010–11)

- Role of the United Kingdom in the Libyan Crisis (2011)

- Conclusion

- About the Author

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Setting and Context

Application of the Two Level Game Theory to the Case Studies

Launching CSDP / Constructive Role of Britain (1998–99)

Initial Development of the CSDP: UK Blocking the Operational HQ (2010–11)

Role of the United Kingdom in the Libyan Crisis (2011)

Conclusion

About the Author